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RUN-ON SENTENCE: REMEDIES FOR
ERRONEOUS CAREER OFFENDER
ENHANCEMENTS
JOHN PATRICK BAILEY†
ABSTRACT
Guilty pleas have come to resolve all but a fraction of federal
criminal cases. So for most federal defendants, sentencing is the
criminal justice process’s most important phase. That phase begins
with the calculation of a recommended sentencing range based on the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. If a defendant has previously committed
two violent crimes or drug offenses, the Guidelines designate him a
career offender and drastically enhance his recommended sentencing
range. The range is only advisory, but judges must consult and
account for the range, and it plays an unquestionably significant role
in the defendant’s ultimate sentence. What if the Supreme Court later
clarifies that the defendant’s crimes were not career offender
predicates after all? What if the correct inputs would have yielded a
shorter sentence?
This Note examines remedies for mistakes like erroneously
applying the career offender enhancement. It begins by exploring the
federal sentencing system’s background and the available remedies
for sentencing errors in general, including some remedies grounded in
a due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information. It
discusses sentencing and appellate-review practices since the Supreme
Court made the Guidelines advisory, and observes how courts of
appeals have treated those practices—erroneous career offender
enhancements are generally curable on direct appeal, but recent
appellate decisions have denied relief to prisoners who are subjected
to the same errors but whose sentences had already become final. This
discussion concludes by scrutinizing those cases and discussing them
in the context of concerns for due process and fundamental fairness.
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INTRODUCTION
Guilty pleas resolve all but a fraction of federal criminal cases, so
1
most defendants’ prison time depends almost entirely on sentencing.
Broadly speaking, that process begins with a presentence report
2
about the defendant and the offense and with a Sentencing
Guidelines range based on the crime’s offense level and the
3
defendant’s criminal history. The range is intended to reflect the
Sentencing Commission’s expert assessment, based on congressional
and judicial policy, of the appropriate punishment for particular
defendants and their crimes.
The calculation’s most crucial inflection point is whether
defendants qualify for a “Criminal History Override”—that is, one of
the
Guidelines
enhancements
that
increase
defendants’
recommended sentences more severely than anything else in the
4
Guidelines. The most common override is the career offender
enhancement: defendants with two prior felonies for drugs or
violence see their offense level, criminal history, and downstream
5
Guidelines range increase dramatically.
But what if the judge makes a mistake? What if the judge counts
a defendant’s prior misdemeanor as a felony instead? Or what if the
Supreme Court later clarifies that a career offender’s predicates
6
should not have counted toward an enhancement in the first place?
In the 2015 term, the Supreme Court introduced even more
uncertainty into the system by going beyond excluding certain crimes
from the list of valid predicates and ruling that certain language
1. See Figure C: Guilty Pleas and Trial Rates, 2014 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing
Statistics, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/FigureC.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y2DY-X27F]
(demonstrating that pleas dispose of 97 percent of federal cases).
2. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)–(b) (providing for presentence investigation and report).
3. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2014) (detailing instructions for calculating and applying the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).
4. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Criminal History Outline 9–12 (paper presented at the U.S.
Sentencing Commission 2011 Annual National Seminar), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/training/annual-national-training-seminar/2011/004a_Criminal_History_Outline.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4HYP-HLQ5]; see, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3A1.4
(“Terrorism”), 4B1.1 (“Career Offender”), 4B1.4 (“Armed Career Criminal”), 4B1.5 (“Repeat
and Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors”).
5. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (defining career offenders and
setting forth the status’s enhancements).
6. See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 122 (2009) (holding that an escape
conviction based on a failure to report is not a “violent felony”); Begay v. United States, 553
U.S. 137, 141 (2008) (holding that a drunk-driving conviction is not a “violent felony”).
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describing violent predicates for statutory minimums—language
identical to the recidivist enhancements in the Guidelines—is
7
unconstitutionally vague. Prisoners in such a predicament face the
legal morass of sentence review that emerged after Congress
remodeled sentencing into a mandatory-guidelines system, which the
8
Supreme Court in turn upended in United States v. Booker by making
9
that system advisory.
This Note examines the remedies for those mistakes, in
particular for mistaken career offender enhancements. Part I surveys
the legislative–judicial tug-of-war that produced today’s advisoryGuidelines regime, including practices before and after the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. In particular, this Part points out a
collateral remedy for sentencing mistakes that emanates from a due
process right to be sentenced based on accurate information.
Part II explores sentencing and appellate-review practices since
Booker, including advisory sentencing and the “reasonableness” test
for appellate review that the advisory system spawned. Part III
examines how courts of appeals have implemented this test.
Part IV explores remedies on collateral review. Guilty pleas
resolve cases quickly, but cases redefining enhancement predicates
may come years after the appeal window has closed. Prisoners
challenging career offender mistakes are likely to do so on collateral
review. Unfortunately for them, courts of appeals have recently said
that collateral review is too late. Applying a scantly developed
standard that asks whether leaving the error uncorrected would
amount to a “miscarriage of justice,” these courts have said it would
not. Many of these decisions cite an interest in finality and the district
10
judge’s discretion should the defendant be resentenced.
But history reveals that the bar for collaterally correcting a
mistaken sentence is even higher today than in the pre-reform era—
an era in which sentencing judges had far more discretion, and even
direct appeal offered little or no review. In the decades of change for

7. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015) (holding that defining a predicate
crime of violence—for purposes of a recidivist enhancement that entails a mandatory minimum
sentence—as one that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another” was void for vagueness).
8. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
9. Id. at 245 (holding that the Sixth Amendment rendered the mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines unconstitutional and remedying that flaw by making the Guidelines advisory); see
infra Part I.C.
10. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2013).
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federal sentencing, courts of appeals—and even advocates for
mistaken career offenders—have largely overlooked these due
process rights, which historically guaranteed an accurate basis for
federal prisoners’ sentences. Part IV concludes by discussing the
denial of collateral relief for mistaken career offenders in the context
of due process in sentencing, particularly in a system in which
sentencing is often all that matters.
I. THE MODERN SENTENCING SYSTEM’S EVOLUTION
A. Sentencing Pre-Reform
For most of the federal system’s history, judges had nearlimitless sentencing discretion as long as sentences were within
11
statutory limits. As the Supreme Court observed, appellate review
began “with the general proposition that once it [was] determined
that a sentence [was] within the limitations set forth in the statute
12
under which it [was] imposed, appellate review [was] at an end.”
Nonetheless, review was not entirely unavailable: Defendants
13
could challenge sentences that were cruel and unusual or those
14
based on constitutionally impermissible factors. Courts of appeals
also corrected sentences with underlying evidentiary or procedural
15
flaws. As the Seventh Circuit put it, “convicted defendants ha[d] a
11. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (“Before the Guidelines system, a federal
criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical purposes, not reviewable on
appeal.”).
12. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974).
13. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (concluding that life imprisonment for
passing a bad check amounted to cruel and unusual punishment).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that sex
was an impermissible factor to justify a sentencing disparity between two codefendants).
15. See United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863, 863 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding
that a sentence violated due process when it was based on the mistaken belief that the
defendant had previously been convicted of armed robbery instead of just robbery); United
States v. Ruster, 712 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[Relying] on materially false or unreliable
information in sentencing [violates] the defendant's due process rights.”); United States v.
Jones, 640 F.2d 284, 286 (10th Cir. 1981) (“[Supreme Court] cases recognize a due process right
to be sentenced only on information which is accurate.”); United States v. DiRusso, 548 F.2d
372, 374 (1st Cir. 1976) (“[Federal habeas relief] permits collateral attacks on sentences which
were based upon fundamental errors in evaluating the criminal defendant.”); Hess v. United
States, 496 F.2d 936, 940 (8th Cir. 1974) (“[A] sentence based upon materially false information
. . . could not stand.”); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[A]
defendant retains the right not to be sentenced on the basis of invalid premises.”); United States
v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 816 (2d Cir. 1970) (“Misinformation or misunderstanding that is
materially untrue regarding a prior criminal record, or material false assumptions as to any facts
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due process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate
16
information.”
This right provided a remedy of resentencing for sentences based
17
on “materially false or unreliable” information. Courts of appeals
18
19
generally relied on Townsend v. Burke and United States v. Tucker,
cases in which judges sentenced uncounseled defendants based on
20
misunderstood criminal histories or constitutionally invalid prior
21
convictions. Although both cases involved Sixth Amendment rightto-counsel concerns as well, these courts emphasized Townsend’s
declaration that a sentence based on “assumptions concerning [a
defendant’s] criminal record which were materially untrue, . . .
whether caused by carelessness or design, is inconsistent with due
22
process of law.” Indeed, the “pronouncement of [a] sentence on a
foundation so extensively and materially false . . . renders the
23
proceedings lacking in due process.”
B. The Sentencing-Reform Movement
24

Not only were sentences only reviewable on a limited basis, but
25
they were also indeterminate. Judges were expected to hand down
fairly long prison terms and, after prisoners served at least one-third

relevant to sentencing, renders the entire sentencing procedure invalid as a violation of due
process.”).
16. Lane, 738 F.2d at 864.
17. See, e.g., Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1359 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[A] sentence
will be vacated on appeal if the challenged information is (1) false or unreliable, and (2)
demonstrably made the basis for the sentence.”).
18. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
19. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
20. Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741. In Townsend, the judge sentenced Frank Townsend after
referencing crimes for which Townsend was adjudged not guilty. Id. at 740.
21. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 444–45. In Tucker, the judge sentenced Forrest Tucker to twentyfive years in prison based partly on three prior felony convictions. Id. Years later, a court
concluded that two of the felonies were constitutionally invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), because Tucker was unrepresented by counsel when he pleaded guilty to
them. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 445.
22. Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741.
23. Id.
24. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443 (1974).
25. See Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too
Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 696–97 (2010) (recounting the
era of indeterminate sentencing).
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of their term, the federal Parole Commission set a release date upon
26
determining the prisoner was successfully rehabilitated.
By the 1980s, scholars, judges, lawmakers, and the public
recognized the considerable flaws in the “‘lawless’ process[] of
27
indeterminate sentencing.” The federal system’s critics pointed to
sentencing disparities for the same crime across courts, districts, and
28
circuits. Because of parole, judges often tried to predict the Parole
29
Commission’s future decisions, so sentences often bore little relation
30
to real prison time. Critics sought “truth in sentencing,” whereby the
public could realistically discern a convicted criminal’s actual jail
31
time. Federal statutes also failed to consistently reflect the relative
32
seriousness of individual crimes.
33
This discontent produced “a remarkable burst of reform”
34
culminating in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA). The SRA
“revolutionized the manner in which district courts sentence[d]
35
persons convicted of federal crimes.” It created a determinate
26. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) (“Th[e] indeterminatesentencing system was supplemented by the utilization of parole, by which an offender was
returned to society under the ‘guidance and control’ of a parole officer.”); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at
40 (1983) (explaining the federal system of sentencing and parole that preceded the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984); see also 45 CONG. REC. 6374 (1910) (statement of Rep. Clayton) (“The
defendant was eligible for release on parole after serving one-third of his term.”).
27. KEVIN R. REITZ, Sentencing: Guidelines, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
1429, 1429 (Joshua Dressler et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002); see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 49 (1973) (describing indeterminate sentencing as “the
absence of rational ordering, the unbridled power of the sentencers to be arbitrary and
discriminatory”).
28. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 41 (“The absence of a comprehensive Federal sentencing law
. . . creates inevitable disparity in the sentences which courts impose on similarly situated
defendants. This occurs in sentences handed down by judges in the same district and by judges
from different districts and circuits in the Federal system.”).
29. See id. at 46 (“Sentencing judges . . . are tempted to sentence a defendant on the basis
of when they believe the Parole Commission will release him.”).
30. See id. at 48 (“[J]udges need not specify the reasons for their sentencing decisions, and
usually they do not indicate the length of time they expect an offender to spend in prison.”).
31. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Feinberg, Truth and Fairness in Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
1987, at A31 (advocating that the Sentencing Reform Act would bring transparency and clarity
to federal sentencing).
32. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 39 (“Current Federal law . . . specifies the maximum term of
imprisonment and the maximum fine for each Federal offense . . . with little regard for the
relative seriousness of the offense as compared to similar offenses.”).
33. SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990, at 112–13 (1993).
34. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
35. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 132 (1991).
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regime based on guidelines written by the U.S. Sentencing
36
Commission. Grounded in empirical research, the Guidelines were
intended to address the seriousness of individual crimes, account for
37
defendants’ criminal history, and reduce unwarranted disparities.
Congress codified the Act’s guiding principles in 18 U.S.C.
38
§ 3553. By its terms, § 3553 directed courts to impose sentences
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to further federal
39
sentencing’s purposes. Those purposes included finding sentences
that reflect the particular offense and offender and avoiding
40
unwarranted disparities among similarly situated offenders. Under
the SRA as originally passed, sentencing judges calculated a
mandatory-Guidelines range and chose an appropriate sentence
41
within it.

36. Sentencing Reform Act §§ 217–218.
37. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 50–60 (explaining the goals and reasoning behind the
Sentencing Guidelines); see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2012) (outlining the purposes of the
Sentencing Commission, including establishing federal sentencing policies and practices that
“provide certainty and fairness . . . [and] avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct”).
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012) (providing the SRA’s guiding principles).
39. See id. § 3553(a) (“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes [of this provision].”).
40. The full text of the provision details a list of the many factors courts should weigh when
selecting a sentence. The text of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) reads,
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.—The court shall impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set
forth [below]. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall
consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range [in the Sentencing
Guidelines] . . .
(5) any pertinent policy statement . . . issued by the Sentencing Commission . . .
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
41. See id. § 3553(a)(4) (mandating that reviewing courts consider the sentencing range as
established by Sentencing Commission guidelines).
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Together with meaningful appellate review, this determinate
system sought to deliver consistent application of federal sentencing
law and provide for punishment that accounted for specific offenses
and individuals without disparately punishing similarly situated
42
offenders.
C. The Federal Guidelines and the Sixth Amendment
The first version of the Guidelines went into effect in November
43
1987. For more than a decade, the federal sentencing system
44
operated as a mandatory regime wherein the Sentencing Guidelines
45
had “the force and effect of laws.” Appellate courts had the
authority to correct sentences if judges miscalculated the Guidelines
46
or unreasonably departed from them.
In 2000, the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New
47
Jersey marked the beginning of a string of Sixth Amendment cases
that collided with the Guidelines and ultimately rendered them
48
advisory. In Apprendi, the Court considered a hate-crime
enhancement that increased a firearm offense’s maximum sentence
49
from ten to twenty years. The Court held that any fact, other than a
prior conviction, that increases a crime’s statutory maximum must be
50
admitted or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Because a
jury did not find the racial-motivation factor that increased the
Apprendi defendant’s statutory maximum, New Jersey’s hate-crime
51
statute was unconstitutional.

42. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 213, 98 Stat. 1837, 2011 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1984)).
43. See id. § 235 (outlining the procedures for when the first guidelines would take effect);
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987) (“[U]nder the
present statute the[se guidelines] take effect automatically on November 1, 1987.”); see also
Andrew von Hirsch, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Do They Provide Principled Guidance?, 27
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 367, 367–69 (1989) (detailing the period leading up to the Sentencing
Commission’s first Guidelines Manual).
44. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (“[Congress] settl[ed] on a
mandatory-guideline system . . . .”).
45. Id. at 413 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
46. Sentencing Reform Act § 213(a).
47. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
48. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 248 (2005) (citing Apprendi and discussing
subsequent advisories issued by the Department of Justice).
49. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
50. Id. at 490.
51. Id.
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Four years later in Blakely v. Washington, the Court explained
that under Washington’s mandatory sentencing regime, the top of the
53
sentencing range was the effective statutory maximum. Therefore,
judge-found facts that increased a mandatory sentencing range
54
violated the Sixth Amendment.
After Apprendi and Blakely, invalidating the mandatory federal
Guidelines was only a short step away for the Court in Booker. On
the facts of Freddie Booker’s federal crack-cocaine conviction, his
Guidelines range was 210 to 262 months, but the sentencing judge
found aggravating factors that increased that range to between 360
55
months and life imprisonment. The judge sentenced Booker to 360
56
months.
Booker produced two majority opinions. Five Justices (“merits
majority”) agreed that the mandatory Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment because, like the state guidelines in Blakely, they
57
increased authorized sentences based on judge-found facts. A
separate majority (“remedial majority”) held that the remedy for the
58
Guidelines’ constitutional flaw was to make them advisory. In an
opinion by Justice Breyer, the remedial majority excised the portions
59
of the SRA that made the Guidelines mandatory. Sentencing judges
should still calculate the “effectively advisory” range to consider in
60
light of § 3553(a). Rather than de novo review, courts of appeals
61
would review for “unreasonableness” based on § 3553(a).

52. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
53. Id. at 303. Ralph Blakely pleaded guilty to kidnapping, for which the top end of his
mandatory-guidelines range was 53 months. Id. at 298. The judge found that Blakely had acted
with “deliberate cruelty,” which increased his sentencing range. Id. Based on this sentence
enhancement, the judge sentenced him to 90 months, beyond the 53-month “maximum” he
could have received based on a guilty plea alone. Id.
54. Id.
55. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235 (2005).
56. Id. Notably, the sentence was above the 262-month maximum based solely on the jury
verdict. Id. at 227.
57. Id. at 244. Justice Ginsburg was the only common Justice, but did not write an opinion.
58. Id. at 245.
59. Id. The Court invalidated § 3553(b)(1), which required within-range sentences, and
§ 3742(e), which provided for de novo review, reasoning that without those provisions, the
Guidelines were effectively advisory. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 264.
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II. SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER: ADVISORY GUIDELINES
AND REASONABLENESS REVIEW
A. Guidelines Calculation and Sentencing
After a conviction or guilty plea, statutory provisions and the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure govern a defendant’s
sentencing. Section 3553(d) provides that the court must give the
parties notice, hear them on relevant matters, provide opportunities
62
to address the court, and ultimately explain the sentence.
63
Rule 32 outlines the actual process. Sentencing begins with an
investigation into the circumstances of the crime and into the
64
defendant’s background, criminal history, and financial situation.
65
This investigation produces a presentence report (PSR), which
66
includes a calculation of the defendant’s Guidelines range.
Defendants have an opportunity to object to errors after receiving the
67
PSR and at sentencing. In arriving at a sentence, judges can consider
68
a wide variety of evidence not normally admissible at trial and find
69
facts based on a preponderance of the evidence. The defendant,
62. See 18 U.S.C. 3553(d) (2012).
63. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.
64. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)–(d); see also 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ANDREW D. LEIPOLD,
PETER J. HENNING & SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 522 (2d
ed. 1982) (“Presentence reports are intended to provide the sentencing judge with objective and
accurate information relating to the defendant.”).
65. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)–(e).
66. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1).
67. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)(1) (“Within 14 days after receiving the presentence report
[(PSR)], the parties must state in writing any objections, including objections to material
information, sentencing guideline ranges, and policy statements contained in or omitted from
the report.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i) (providing an opportunity at sentencing hearings for
defendants to object to their PSR’s material and provide evidence to support the objection).
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012) (“No limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a
court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence.”); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. background (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (“In determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges are not
restricted to information that would be admissible at trial.”); see also United States v. Watts, 519
U.S. 148, 154 (1997) (holding that a sentencing court can consider acquitted conduct); Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399–401 (1995) (discussing the variety of relied-upon information).
69. See Watts, 519 U.S. at 156 (1997) (“[A]pplication of the preponderance standard at
sentencing generally satisfies due process.”); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)
(endorsing a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard at sentencing); see also U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. background (“The Commission believes that use of a
preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process
requirements . . . .”).
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attorneys, and any victims also have an opportunity to address the
70
court.
After input from the parties, the judge formulates a sentence
sufficient, but no greater than necessary, to further the goals
enumerated by Congress in § 3553(a). The Supreme Court has
explained this begins with consulting a properly calculated Guidelines
71
range. Having consulted the Guidelines range, input from the
parties, and any other relevant facts, the court considers the § 3553(a)
72
factors and determines the appropriate sentence. A judge may
choose an out-of-Guidelines sentence, but must ensure the facts
73
justify the degree of variance.
1. Calculation of the Guidelines. The Guidelines calculation
occupies a particularly important place in sentencing, and errors often
translate into an inaccurate Guidelines range. Understanding the
74
Guidelines’ mechanics illuminates potential errors. Any Guidelines
calculation rests on the information in a jury verdict or guilty plea and
the information gathered during the presentence investigation. Two
factors produce the sentencing range: an offense level for the crime
75
and a criminal history category for the defendant. Offense levels
76
range from one to forty-three. Defendants receive criminal history
points from zero to thirteen, which place them in a category of I to
77
VI. A Sentencing Table grid with axes for offense level and criminal
history ultimately yields a range of months for the defendant’s
78
sentence.
The Guidelines Manual lays out a multistep process for
calculating each crime’s offense level and each defendant’s criminal
history category. The court first determines a crime’s base offense

70. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4).
71. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[T]he Guidelines should be the starting
point and the initial benchmark.”).
72. Id. at 49–50.
73. Id. at 50.
74. For a helpful roadmap of the Guidelines calculation, see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20–26 (1991).
75. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2014).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. (providing the parameters for such a Table).
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79

level by referring to Chapter Two. Chapter Two groups offenses by
type and assigns base offense levels depending on the offense’s
80
seriousness. The court also applies offense characteristics, which
81
tailor the offense level to the seriousness of the crime. For example,
82
the base level for obstruction-of-justice crimes is fourteen, which
increases to twenty-two if the obstruction involved “causing or
threatening to cause physical injury to a person, or property
83
damage.”
The court then applies adjustments in Chapter Three, which
increase or decrease the offense level depending on the crime’s
84
85
circumstances. These adjustments include victim-related factors,
86
the defendant’s role in the offense, and increases for certain
87
circumstances relating to obstructing justice.
The Manual outlines a process for calculating the offense level
88
for defendants with multiple counts. This seeks to accurately account

79. See generally id. ch. 2.
80. Id. § 1B1.1(a)–(b); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 74, at 21 (“The
starting point for sentencing an individual defendant under the guidelines system is the
determination of the base offense level.”). Each offense type in Chapter Two lists the statutory
provisions to which it applies. For example, section 2K1.1 is titled “Failure to Report Theft of
Explosive Materials; Improper Storage of Explosive Materials” and groups together the
statutory offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 842(j) (violating explosives-storage regulations), § 842(k)
(knowingly failing to report the theft or loss of explosives from one’s stock), and § 844(b) (the
penalty provision for the two preceding offenses). U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2K1.1. The Sentencing Manual also includes in an appendix an index of each statutory offense
and its corresponding Chapter Two offense type. Id. app. A.
81. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(2).
82. Id. § 2J1.2(a).
83. Id. § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B).
84. See id. ch. 3 (providing a list of adjustments based on aggravating and mitigating
factors).
85. Id. ch. 3, pt. A (“Victim-Related Adjustments”); see, e.g., id. § 3A1.1 (providing for an
increased offense level if the defendant had a hate-crime motivation or targeted a vulnerable
victim).
86. Id. ch. 3, pt. B (“Role in the Offense”); see, e.g., id. § 3B1.1(b)(1) (increasing the
offense level by four levels if the defendant was an organizer or leader of criminal activity that
involved five or more people); id. § 3B1.2(a) (decreasing the offense level by four levels for
minimal participants).
87. Id. ch. 3, pt. C (“Obstruction and Related Adjustments”); see, e.g., id. § 3C1.2
(increasing the offense level by two levels if the defendant recklessly endangered others during
flight).
88. Id. ch. 3, pt. D (“Multiple Counts”).
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89

for the harm caused without disproportionately stacking punishment
90
or adding up punishments when they do not reflect multiple harms.
The court may decrease a defendant’s offense level by two levels if he
91
“clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.”
Next is criminal history. The Guidelines determine criminal
history by adding up points for any prior offenses, the total of which
places the defendant in a particular category. Several enhancements
punish defendants who exhibit criminal patterns by increasing their
92
criminal history category and offense level. Called “Criminal History
93
Overrides” in some Commission materials,
these are the
94
“Armed Career
enhancement sections “Career Offender,”
95
Criminal,” and “Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender Against
96
Minors.”
97
The career offender enhancement is the most common. It
applies to felony defendants with at least two convictions for a crime
98
99
of violence or a controlled-substance offense. If applied, a

89. See id. ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (“A defendant who assaults others during a fight,
for example, may warrant more punishment if he injures ten people than if he injures one, but
his conduct does not necessarily warrant ten times the punishment.”).
90. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 74, at 23 (“Some offenses . . . are so closely
related that they result in essentially the same harm. . . . [T]he guidelines group the offenses and
apply the offense level for the most serious offense without adding levels for the closely-related
offenses.”).
91. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (“Acceptance of Responsibility”).
92. See, e.g., id. §§ 4B1.1 (“Career Offender”), 4B1.4 (“Armed Career Criminal”), 4B1.5
(“Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors”).
93. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 4, at 9.
94. Id. at 10.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Table 20: Offenders Receiving Chapter Four Criminal History Points, 2013 Sourcebook
of Federal Sentencing Statistics, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (2013), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/Table20.pdf
[http://perma.cc/P8T9-E4Q5].
98. The Guidelines define “crime of violence” as any federal or state offense punishable by
more than one year in prison that “(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
99. Id. § 4B1.1(a). The Guidelines define “controlled substance offense” as any federal or
state offense punishable by more than one year in prison that “prohibits the manufacture,
import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance)
or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to
manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” Id. § 4B1.2(b).
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defendant’s criminal history increases to the highest category and his
100
offense level rises proportionally to the crime’s statutory maximum.
For the average career offender, the recommended range more than
101
doubles. Other than acceptance of responsibility, it also renders
102
Chapter Three adjustments inapplicable.
After progressing through the calculation of offense level and
criminal history, the court matches the two on the Sentencing Table
103
in Chapter Five to find the recommended range.
Booker afforded courts the discretion to go outside this range,
104
but sentences have not changed much. The Guidelines remain the
“essential starting point,” with slightly more below-range sentences in
105
106
general, particularly for fraud and child pornography. Sentences
107
for drugs, firearms, and immigration have remained stable. The law
governing sentences’ review on appeal, however, has developed
dynamically.

100. See id. § 4B1.1(b) (“A career offender’s criminal history category in every case under
this subsection shall be Category VI.”); id. ch. 5, pt. A (showing Category VI as the highest
criminal history category). For example, if the instant offense has a statutory maximum of life,
the defendant’s offense level would increase to thirty-seven. Id. § 4B1.1(b). Absent any other
adjustments, his Guidelines range would be 360 months to life imprisonment. Id. ch. 5, pt. A.
101. For the average career offender who faces an increase in the final offense level and
criminal history category, the enhancement increases the offense level from twenty-four to
thirty-one and the criminal history from IV to VI. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS:
CAREER OFFENDERS 1 (2014). This increases the range’s low end from 77 months to 188 (an
increase of 144 percent equal to an additional 9.25 years) and the high end from 96 months up to
235 (an increase of 145 percent equal to an additional 11.58 years). U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A.
102. See United States v. Johnson, 155 F.3d 682, 684 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Other adjustments are
thus effectively overwritten by the magnitude of the career offender upward adjustment.”);
United States v. Beltran, 122 F.3d 1156, 1160 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that reductions for a
mitigating role did not apply because “[t]he career offender guideline trumps all other offense
level adjustments . . . except[] . . . acceptance of responsibility”); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
CRIMINAL HISTORY PRIMER 8 (2013) (“A career offender may receive a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility . . . [but] other Chapter 3 adjustments may not apply.”).
103. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A.
104. For an in-depth examination of Booker’s effect on federal sentencing, see U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 28–50, 59 (2012). See also Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing
Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 30–41 (2010) (reviewing interjudge
disparity in sentencing pre-Booker, post-Booker, and during the Kimbrough/Gall period).
105. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 104, at 60.
106. Id. at 67–68.
107. Id. at 62–66.
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B. Appellate Review Post-Booker: Reasonableness
Appellate review has evolved as courts try to implement
108
Booker’s “reasonableness” review. In Rita v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that appellate courts may presume a within109
Guidelines sentence is reasonable. The Guidelines “seek to embody
110
the § 3553(a) considerations, both in principle and in practice,” and
“reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve
111
§ 3553(a)’s objectives.”
The Court explained “reasonableness” in greater detail in Gall v.
112
113
United States and Kimbrough v. United States. Despite a range of
30 to 37 months, Brian Gall received probation because the judge
found his intervening behavior made prison unnecessary to meet
114
§ 3553(a)’s goals. The Eighth Circuit held that such large variances
115
required “extraordinary circumstances,” and reversed.
116
The Supreme Court rejected this approach, emphasizing that
all sentences should be reviewed for reasonableness “whether inside
117
or outside the Guidelines range.” The test involves a two-step
118
inquiry into procedural and substantive reasonableness. Procedural
review looks for “significant procedural error[s]” like miscalculating
or failing to calculate the Guidelines, ignoring the § 3553(a) factors,
relying on “clearly erroneous facts,” or inadequately explaining the

108. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
109. Id. at 347.
110. Id. at 350.
111. Id.
112. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
113. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
114. Gall, 552 U.S. at 43–45. Brian Gall pleaded guilty to his involvement in an Iowa
ecstasy-trafficking conspiracy. Id. at 41–42. Gall eventually stopped using drugs, withdrew from
the conspiracy, graduated from college, moved to Arizona, and, to all observers, became a
rehabilitated, productive member of society. Id. Gall was eventually indicted, pleaded guilty,
and cooperated with authorities—although he did not have information to offer investigators to
qualify for a substantial-assistance motion. Id. at 42–43.
115. Id. at 45.
116. The Court noted that proportional or mathematical tests of outside-range sentences
came too close to making the Guidelines mandatory. Id. at 47.
117. Id. at 49.
118. Id. at 51.
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119

sentence. If a sentence is procedurally sound, appellate courts assess
120
substantive reasonableness, looking for “abuse of discretion.”
In Kimbrough, the judge sentenced a crack-cocaine defendant
121
below his Guidelines range, citing the “disproportionate and unjust
122
effect” of differing crack- and powder-cocaine Guidelines. The
Fourth Circuit held that outside-range sentences based on policy
123
disagreements were per se unreasonable. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that a judge may determine that the disparity yields
124
a greater sentence than necessary to achieve § 3553(a)’s goals.
III. CHALLENGING ERRORS ON DIRECT APPEAL
Defendants challenge sentencing errors within the framework of
Gall’s reasonableness test. This Note concerns mistakes about the
facts, law, or process that underpin a sentence rather than attacking
the reasonableness of sentences based on accurate factual and legal
premises. Correcting these underlying mistakes falls under Gall’s
procedural prong. Grave procedural errors can render the sentence
125
substantively unreasonable, but substantive reasonableness turns on
weighing the facts and law rather than the reliability of the facts, law,
126
and process.
Procedural errors fall loosely into factual and legal errors.
Factual errors include findings relied on for the Guidelines range or

119. Id.
120. Id. This deferential inquiry accounts for the totality of the circumstances, considering
the extent of any deviation from the Guidelines range but giving due deference to the district
court’s decision to deviate. Id.
121. At sentencing, the defendant’s Guidelines range was 228 to 270 months, but the judge
sentenced him to 180 months in prison and 60 months of probation. Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 93 (2007).
122. Id. Under the Guidelines in place during Kimbrough’s sentencing, a drug dealer selling
crack cocaine faced the same sentence as one selling 100 times more powder cocaine. Id. at 94.
123. Id. at 93.
124. Id. at 110.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[Procedural flaws]
resulted in a substantively unreasonable sentence.”); United States v. Cutler, 520 F.3d 136, 176
(2d Cir. 2008) (determining a sentence substantively unreasonable “[g]iven the procedural
errors, the clear factual errors, and the misinterpretations of the § 3553(a) factors”).
126. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[Substantive
reasonableness is] whether a factor relied on by a sentencing court can bear the weight assigned
to it.”).
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§ 3355(a) evaluation, such as factually inaccurate drug quantities.
Legal errors include incorrect Guidelines interpretations and
procedural flaws, such as inaccurately treating a conviction as a crime
128
129
of violence or wrongly counting victims for the fraud guideline.
These also include oversights in the sentencing process, like a judge
130
131
misunderstanding her authority, relying on improper premises, or
providing insufficient reasons for a departure from the recommended
132
range.
Other than at sentencing, direct appeal is a defendant’s main
avenue for alleging errors. Booker excised the portion of § 3742 that
based appellate review on the Guidelines’ mandatory nature but left
the remaining provisions intact, including those providing for appeal
133
of sentences. And in addition to the reasonableness standard
(refined in Gall), unpreserved objections face plain-error analysis and
134
preserved objections are still analyzed for harmless error.
A. Preserved Error—Harmless-Error Analysis
When appellate courts review preserved objections, a
combination of standards apply depending on the nature of the error.
Courts review factual determinations for clear error and legal

127. See, e.g., United States v. Galloway, 509 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2007) (remanding
where the record showed no basis for the district court’s loss estimate for sentencing
enhancement).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Sanchez, 307 F. App’x 797, 798 (5th Cir. 2009)
(remanding where nothing in the record supported the determination that the prior offenses
were violent crimes).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding
where the district court misinterpreted which individuals counted as victims for enhancement
within the fraud guideline).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Vandewege, 561 F.3d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding
reversible error where the sentencing judge did not recognize that he had the authority to
depart from the Guidelines based on disagreement with the ratio between crack and powder
cocaine).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding plain error
necessitating remand when the judge sentenced a sex offender, in part, based on an improper
apparent belief that the sex offender was genetically predisposed to commit sex crimes).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 675 F.3d 1021, 1026 (7th Cir. 2012) (remanding
where the sentencing judge failed to justify a sentence 169 months above the Guidelines range).
133. Id. at 260–61; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2012) (providing for the appeal of sentences
“imposed in violation of the law,” “imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines,” or “imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline
and is plainly unreasonable”).
134. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005).
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135

Sentencing courts find facts by a
conclusions de novo.
136
preponderance of the evidence.
Because relying on “clearly
137
erroneous facts” is a significant procedural error, courts of appeals
138
review factual findings for clear error. Legal conclusions, including
139
140
Guidelines interpretations and procedures, are reviewed de novo.
141
Harmless errors “do[] not affect substantial rights.” An error is
harmless unless the sentence’s proponent shows that the sentencing
142
court would impose the same sentence without the error. Courts

135. United States v. McManus, 734 F.3d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 2013) (“We review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.”); United States v.
Tavares, 705 F.3d 4, 24 (1st Cir. 2013) (“We review the district court’s interpretation and
application of the sentencing guidelines de novo and factual findings for clear error.”); United
States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1164 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Within th[e] milieu [of reasonableness
review], we review factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo.”); United
States v. Bates, 584 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 2009) (“We review . . . interpretation . . . of the
guidelines de novo and . . . factual findings for clear error.”); United States v. Lemus-Gonzalez,
563 F.3d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e review the district court’s factual findings for clear error
and its interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo.”); United States v. Armstead, 552
F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing
Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of
discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear error.”).
136. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) (“[A]pplication of the preponderance
standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process.”); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. background (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (“[P]reponderance of the
evidence . . . meet[s] due process requirements.”).
137. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Grigsby, 692 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Sentencing
findings are reviewed for clear error.”); United States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 739
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (applying the clear-error standard to sentencing findings); United States v.
Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (same).
139. See, e.g., McManus, 734 F.3d at 318 (“Interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is a
question of law that we review de novo.”).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Gibbs, 578 F.3d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We review the
procedures followed by the district court de novo.”).
141. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); see also United States v. Grissom, 525 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir.
2008) (explaining that courts of appeals “will remand non-harmless procedural errors”); United
States v. Weems, 517 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 2008) (“A nonharmless error in the calculation of
the applicable guidelines range requires a reviewing court to vacate the sentence and remand
the case for resentencing.”); United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008)
(explaining that “use of an erroneous Guidelines range will typically require reversal . . . [but]
under certain, limited circumstances, miscalculation of the Guidelines may be harmless”).
142. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992) (explaining that remand is
unnecessary if “the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the erroneous
factor”); United States v. McGhee, 651 F.3d 153, 158 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[A] remand is appropriate
unless the reviewing court concludes . . . that the error did not affect the district court’s selection
of the sentence imposed.”); United States v. Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“Remand is not necessary if . . . the error did not affect the district court’s selection of the
sentence imposed.”); United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A
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have found errors harmless if they would not have impacted a
143
Some circuits have treated as
defendant’s Guidelines range.
harmless a judge’s acknowledgment of the potential error and
144
explanation she would impose the same sentence regardless.
In practice, given clear-error review’s deferential nature,
145
challenges to factual findings are difficult. But defendants have

procedural error during sentencing is harmless if the error did not affect the district court's
selection of the sentence imposed . . . [and] we must remand unless the proponent of the
sentence establishes that the error did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence
imposed.”); United States v. Smith, 562 F.3d 866, 879 (7th Cir. 2009) (“An error is harmless if
. . . [it] did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed. An error that
changed the court’s basic framework for determining the sentence cannot be called harmless.”
(citation omitted)); United States v. Cerno, 529 F.3d 926, 939 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Harmlessness
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and the burden of making this showing
falls on the beneficiary of the error.”); United States v. Anderson, 526 F.3d 319, 330 (6th Cir.
2008) (“[T]he party who wishes to defend the sentence [must] persuade the court of appeals that
the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the erroneous factor.”); United
States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, 665 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We would not remand, . . . if the record
indicated clearly that the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it had an
accurate understanding of its authority.”); Langford, 516 F.3d at 215 (“For the error to be
harmless, it must be clear that the error did not affect the district court’s selection of the
sentence imposed.”).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Larios, 593 F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that reliance
on inadmissible evidence at sentencing for purposes of denying the defendant’s safety-valve
motion was harmless because ample evidence supported denial); see also United States v.
Easley, 306 F. App’x 993, 997 (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to rule if the district court erred on drug
quantity because the amount based on reliable evidence exceeded the threshold for the highest
tier of the drug table).
144. See United States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Where a district
judge clearly states that he would impose the same sentence, even if he erred in calculating the
guidelines, then any error in the calculation is harmless.”); United States v. O’Georgia, 569 F.3d
281, 296 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Where a Guidelines departure provision has been erroneously
applied, the resulting sentence may still be procedurally reasonable if the district court has
adequately explained it by reference to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”); United States v.
Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding a judge’s erroneous application of the
extortion-under-color-of-official-right enhancement harmless because she would have so
enhanced the sentence based on § 3553(a) factors without the enhancement); United States v.
Anderson, 517 F.3d 953, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding a sentence where the trial judge
explained his belief that the sentence was appropriate even if he had gotten the calculations
wrong). But see United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding nonharmless
error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the district court erroneously applied an
eight-level intended loss enhancement for a counterfeit-money offense, even though the
sentencing court stated it would have selected the same sentence without the enhancement);
United States v. Bah, 439 F.3d 423, 432 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he district court cannot
preemptively announce an alternative sentence under the § 3553(a) factors without first having
determined the correct advisory guidelines range.”).
145. See United States v. Statham, 581 F.3d 548, 550–51 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district
court’s sentencing enhancements while noting that, although the defendant’s arguments might
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obtained relief based on factual errors in instances where their drug
146
quantity was based on unreliable evidence, when the sentencing
judge relied on an inaccurate record of the defendant’s previous
147
148
deportations, and when the evidence did not sufficiently support
149
or plainly contradicted the sentencing court’s factual findings.
150
151
For legal errors, mistaken criminal history and offense-level
enhancements have consistently amounted to reversible error, as

be persuasive before a sentencing judge, the defendant could not meet the burden of showing
clear error).
146. See United States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699, 707 (7th Cir. 2013) (remanding a drug
defendant’s case where the district court explicitly pointed out the unreliability of the drug
quantity evidence in the PSR, but then relied on a Guidelines range based on that evidence);
United States v. David, 681 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 2012) (remanding a drug defendant’s sentence
where, among other things, the sentencing court did not have a lab report suggesting that the
pills the defendant possessed were likely diluted with substances that would have decreased the
quantity of drugs he possessed).
147. See United States v. Cruz-Pallares, 396 F. App’x 170, 172 (5th Cir. 2010) (remanding for
resentencing a case in which the district court relied on clearly erroneous conclusions that the
illegal-reentry defendant had been previously deported).
148. See United States v. Skys, 637 F.3d 146, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2011) (remanding for
resentencing a case in which the evidence did not support the district court’s finding that the
defendant defrauded ten or more victims, which carried with it a two-point offense-level
increase); United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding
nonharmless error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the sentencing court applied
an erroneous two-level enhancement that increased the defendant’s range from a span of 24 to
30 months to a span of 30 to 57 months, even though the ultimate sentence fell within the
properly calculated range).
149. See United States v. Smalley, 517 F.3d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding nonharmless
error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the district court applied a four-level
enhancement although evidence only supported a three-level enhancement); see also United
States v. Ceballos-Amaya, 470 F. App’x 254, 265 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding nonharmless error
where the district court based an obstruction-of-justice enhancement on the government’s
misstatement at sentencing that the defendant’s wife had provided a false alibi for him at trial,
although the defendant’s wife actually offered no such testimony).
150. See United States v. McManus, 734 F.3d 315, 323 (4th Cir. 2013) (remanding for
resentencing a case in which the district court erroneously applied a five-level pornographydistribution-offense enhancement, producing a Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months instead of
the correct range of 97 to 120 months, even though the defendant’s 72-month sentence fell “well
below the bottom of th[e] corrected range”); United States v. Viezcas-Soto, 562 F.3d 903, 908
(8th Cir. 2009) (remanding for resentencing a case in which the district court erred in its
determination of felony status for one of the defendant’s prior convictions, and applied a
sixteen-level criminal history enhancement because the defendant illegally reentered the United
States having previously committed a purported felony crime of violence); United States v.
Calderon Espinosa, 569 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding reversible error where the
sentencing court erroneously added an additional criminal history point for the defendant's
state loitering offense); United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding
reversible error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the district court erroneously
added an extra point to the defendant’s criminal history score).
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have erroneous career offender enhancements. Legal errors do not
necessarily require resentencing; a number of courts have found them
harmless—that is, where the record indicates the judge would have
153
selected the same sentence without the error. But procedural errors
that potentially subject defendants to higher sentences are not
154
harmless.
B. Unpreserved Error—Plain-Error Analysis
If a defendant does not challenge an error at sentencing,
correcting that error becomes more difficult on appeal. These claims,

151. See United States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding reversible
error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the district court improperly denied the
defendant a three-point offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility).
152. See United States v. Robinson, 639 F.3d 489, 497–98 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding reversible
error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the defendant’s prior felony conviction did
not qualify as a “controlled substance” conviction for purposes of the career offender
enhancement); United States v. Wynn, 579 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding reversible error
and remanding for resentencing a case in which the defendant’s generic state sexual-battery
conviction was not categorically a crime of violence within the meaning of the career offender
enhancement); United States v. Miles, 340 F. App’x 982, 985 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding reversible
error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the district court inaccurately treated the
defendant’s prior escape conviction as a crime of violence for the purposes of the career
offender enhancement).
153. See United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1314 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that the
sentencing court’s erroneous application of the child-pornography Guidelines for 2003, instead
of 2002, was a harmless error because the record indicated that the court would have imposed
the same 420-month sentence under the 2002 Guidelines); United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d
647, 657 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that the district court erred in applying a sixteen-level criminal
history enhancement, but stating that resentencing was not warranted because the judge stated
that he would have imposed the same sentence without the enhancement).
154. See United States v. Bradley, 628 F.3d 394, 400–01 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding
reversible error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the sentencing judge based an
above-Guidelines sentence for a sex offense with a minor on speculation about the defendant’s
past crimes and an improper prediction about a propensity for recidivism); United States v.
Gibbs, 578 F.3d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding reversible error and remanding for sentencing a
case in which the sentencing court failed to calculate a Guidelines range for supervised release);
United States v. Dhafir, 577 F.3d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding reversible error and remanding
for resentencing a case in which the sentencing court erroneously thought that it could not
calculate the Guidelines ranges under multiple provisions when an ambiguous set of facts made
it unclear which Guidelines provision applied); United States v. Cerno, 529 F.3d 926, 939 (10th
Cir. 2008) (finding nonharmless error where the sentencing court failed to consider the relative
force used by a sexual-assault defendant); United States v. Peña-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108,
1109 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding reversible error where the sentencing court failed to respond to a
defendant’s objection to two disputed enhancements); United States v. Peters, 512 F.3d 787,
788–89 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding nonharmless error where the sentencing court failed to rule on
the defendant’s assertion that he should be given a particular sentence that credited him for
time served).
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like unpreserved objections at trial, face plain-error analysis. To
preserve a claim of error, a party must object when the court rules or
156
issues an order and provide the reasons for her objection. Parties
157
generally forfeit unpreserved claims of error on appeal. Rule 52(b)
provides a limited exception: “A plain error that affects substantial
rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the
158
court’s attention.”
159
In United States v. Olano, the Supreme Court laid out the now
160
well-known four-pronged test for plain-error review : (1) there must
have been an error that the objecting party did not affirmatively
161
162
waive, (2) it must be “plain” at the time of appeal, and (3) it must
affect substantial rights, by (4) prejudicing the proceedings’
163
outcome. If the error meets these requirements, correcting it
remains up to the judge’s discretion, exercised only when the error
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
164
judicial proceedings.”
With regard to sentencing errors, unpreserved objections to
factual and legal errors receive the same standard of review as
preserved objections (that is, clear error for factual errors and de
165
novo review for legal errors) and must affect substantial rights. To
show prejudice from sentencing errors, some courts have required
defendants to show they would have otherwise received a more
166
lenient sentence. Where harmless-error analysis places the burden

155. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133–34 (2009) (confirming the
appropriateness of applying plain-error analysis when the government violates its pleaagreement obligations, but the defendant objects for the first time on appeal).
156. FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b).
157. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (discussing the history and
application of the contemporaneous-objection rule).
158. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
159. United States v. Olano, 506 U.S. 725 (1993).
160. For an elaboration on Olano’s four-pronged test, see Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S.
461, 466, 468 (1997).
161. Olano, 506 U.S. at 733.
162. Id. at 734.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 726 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
165. See United States v. Ortiz, 741 F.3d 288, 293–94 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[T]he plain error
standard imposes upon the appealing defendant the burden of showing a reasonable likelihood
that, but for the error, the district court would have imposed a different, more favorable
sentence.”).
166. See United States v. Durham, 645 F.3d 883, 900 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[An] error affected
[the defendant’s] substantial rights [if it] result[ed] in a different sentence than he otherwise
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167

on the sentence’s proponent, plain error places it on the sentence’s
168
challenger.
In this context, factual errors that impact a defendant’s sentence
still merit correction. Courts of appeals have granted relief where a
169
PSR included a conviction that had been dismissed, where the
record contradicted a judge’s view of the defendant’s prior criminal
170
activity, and where a third party’s criminal activity was attributed to
171
the defendant. Relief has also been warranted where facts cited at
172
sentencing simply lack enough evidentiary support.
Under plain-error analysis, courts of appeals have also corrected
legal errors that contributed to an inaccurate Guidelines range. The
Ninth Circuit remanded a sentence that, without explanation, did not
would have received.”); United States v. Meacham, 567 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating
that a defendant must show a “strong possibility of receiving a significantly lower sentence” in
order to meet the fourth prong); United States v. Burnette, 518 F.3d 942, 947 (8th Cir. 2008)
(“In sentencing, an error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable probability the defendant would
have received a lighter sentence but for the error.”).
167. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
169. See Ortiz, 741 F.3d at 293–94 (finding plain error where the sentencing judge sentenced
a felon-in-possession defendant based on the belief he had previously been convicted of
contempt, but the contempt charge had in fact been dismissed).
170. United States v. Desrosiers, 568 F. App’x 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding plain error
where the sentencing judge mentioned that the defendant aided in preparing more than 2000
fraudulent tax returns, when the PSR and the defendant’s own admissions only indicated that he
had prepared seventy-nine, even though the factual error would not have altered the
defendant’s advisory sentencing range); United States v. Griffiths, 504 F. App’x 122, 126–27 (3d
Cir. 2012) (finding plain error where the sentencing court gave a fraud defendant an eight-level
substantial-assistance reduction because she thought that was the greatest departure that she
had granted in similar cases, when in reality the greatest substantial-assistance reduction she had
given was ten levels); United States v. Gonzalez-Castillo, 562 F.3d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding
plain error where a district judge sentenced an unlawful-entry defendant on the belief that the
defendant had twice before entered the country illegally, but the record indicated that he had
only once before entered the country, and had done so legally).
171. United States v. Wilson, 614 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding plain error where the
sentencing judge imposed an above-Guidelines sentence based on the belief that a
misapprehension-fraud defendant had stolen checks from a bank when, in fact, the record
showed a third party had stolen the checks).
172. United States v. Figueroa-Labrada, 720 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding plain
error where the sentencing court had failed to make factual findings about the scope of a
defendant’s jointly undertaken criminal activity to determine the correct amount of drugs to
attribute to him); United States v. Johnson, 694 F.3d 1192, 1198–99 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding
plain error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the sentencing court failed to make
sufficient factual findings to support a two-level offense enhancement for reckless
endangerment during flight); United States v. Halliday, 672 F.3d 462, 475 (7th Cir. 2012)
(finding plain error where the sentencing judge cited the defendant’s belief that the crime was
“victimless,” but the record did not support that the defendant held such a belief).
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credit a defendant for time served even though the error made only a
173
5-month difference in a 210-month sentence. Reviewing courts have
also remanded where the sentencing court simply miscalculated the
174
Guidelines range by inputting the incorrect offense level or relying
175
on bad math. In the context of sentencing enhancements, courts of
appeals have granted resentencing where a sentencing judge
erroneously treats a defendant’s prior conviction as crime of
176
177
violence, where a court treats prior misdemeanors as felonies, or
where the Guidelines calculation includes prior offenses that should
178
have been excluded altogether. In particular, courts of appeals have
granted relief under plain-error review of erroneous application of

173. United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 785 (9th Cir. 2008). Guidelines section
5G1.3(b)(1) provides for credit against a defendant’s sentence for time served on a state
conviction if the conduct that resulted in that conviction contributed to the calculation of the
defendant’s Guidelines range. Id. at 784; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5G1.3(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Monghan, 409 F. App’x 872, 879 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding plain
error where the sentencing court miscalculated the Guidelines by erroneously using an offense
level of twenty-eight instead of twenty-five, causing the range to be 110 to 137 months instead of
84 to 105 months); United States v. Ysassi, 282 F. App’x 588, 589 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding plain
error where the sentencing court input an offense level of twenty-seven rather than twenty-six,
resulting in a Guidelines range of 100 to 125 months, instead of 92 to 115 months).
175. See United States v. Lee, 288 F. App’x 264, 272 (6th Cir. 2008) (remanding a case for
resentencing after plain-error review because the Probation Office multiplied by the incorrect
number of checks when calculating the total loss from a fraud defendant’s crime).
176. See United States v. Andino-Ortega, 608 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2010) (concluding that
the sentencing judge committed plain error by erroneously treating an illegal-reentry
defendant’s prior state conviction as a crime of violence, which subjected him to a sixteen-point
criminal history enhancement); United States v. Ortuno-Santana, 372 F. App’x 533, 534 (5th
Cir. 2010) (remanding a case in which the judge added offense-level points for a previous drug
conviction that should not have been counted); United States v. Elliott, 313 F. App’x 919, 920
(8th Cir. 2009) (finding plain error where the sentencing judge enhanced the defendant’s
sentence based on case law treating his state conviction as a crime of violence, which an
intervening Supreme Court decision made clear was incorrect); United States v. Gamez, 577
F.3d 394, 401 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that the sentencing court plainly erred by mistakenly
treating the defendant’s prior conviction as a crime of violence); United States v. Diaz-Sanchez,
307 F. App’x 797, 798 (5th Cir. 2009) (remanding a case in which the judge increased the
defendant’s criminal history by sixteen levels based on two prior crimes of violence, although
nothing in the record supported the determination that they were violent crimes).
177. See United States v. Rosales-Miranda, 755 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding
plain error where the sentencing court erroneously treated the defendant’s prior misdemeanors
as felonies); United States v. Burge, 683 F.3d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 2012) (remanding a case in
which the sentencing court erroneously treated the defendant’s animal-cruelty offense as a
felony).
178. See United States v. Garrett, 528 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding plain error
where the sentencing court erroneously added a criminal history point for a bail-jumping
conviction).
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the criminal history overrides—that is, the career offender
179
180
enhancement, the armed career criminal enhancement, and the
181
enhancement for repeat and dangerous sex offenses against minors.
Courts of appeals have granted relief for procedural errors, at
least where defendants have been able show that it impacted their
182
sentencing. Reversible procedural errors include overlooking the
183
Guidelines’ concurrent sentencing instructions, failing to calculate
184
185
the Guidelines, considering improper factors, failing to consider
186
the § 3553(a) factors, and misapprehending discretion to deviate
187
from the Guidelines.

179. See United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 453 (6th Cir. 2009) (remanding a case in
which the evidence was insufficient to determine that the defendant’s reckless-endangerment
conviction was a crime of violence); United States v. Davidson, 551 F.3d 807, 808 (8th Cir. 2008)
(remanding a case in which the court erroneously applied a career offender enhancement based,
in part, on inaccurately treating the defendant’s “auto tampering by operation” offense as a
crime of violence); United States v. Vasquez, 287 F. App’x 610, 611–12 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding
plain error in the application of a career offender enhancement where criminal history
information in the PSR “was not supported by judicially noticeable documentation”).
180. See United States v. Heikes, 525 F.3d 662, 664 (8th Cir. 2008) (applying erroneously an
armed career criminal enhancement based on inaccurate treatment of drunk-driving offenses).
181. See United States v. Sebolt, 554 F. App’x 200, 207 (4th Cir. 2014) (remanding a case
because the court applied a repeat-and-dangerous-sex-offender-against-minors enhancement
based on a predicate offense that did not qualify); United States v. Jeffries, 569 F.3d 873, 877
(8th Cir. 2009) (finding that the sentencing court plainly erred by erroneously treating a prior
sexual offense as a predicate crime).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Highgate, 521 F.3d 590, 595–96 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding plain
error where the sentencing court effectively treated the Guidelines as mandatory and the record
reflected the judge’s apparent desire to give the defendant a more lenient sentence).
183. See United States v. Dooley, 688 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that it amounted
to reversible plain error when a judge imposed consecutive sentences for identity theft but failed
to consider the Guidelines’ note regarding concurrent versus consecutive sentences).
184. See United States v. Dulay, 505 F. App’x 679, 680 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding sentencing
court’s failure to calculate the sentencing range was a plain error that required resentencing).
185. See United States v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103, 1108 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding that the
sentencing court committed plain error by extending the defendant’s sentence an extra 5
months so he could complete a rehabilitation program while in prison); United States v. Cossey,
632 F.3d 82, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that the sentencing court plainly erred when it
sentenced a possession-of-child-pornography offender, and citing the judge’s unproven beliefs
about the genetics of sex offenders and consumers of child pornography); In re Sealed Case, 573
F.3d 844, 853 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding plain error where drug rehabilitation served as the
sentencing judge’s reason for extending the prison term).
186. See United States v. Waknine, 543 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding plain error, in
light of Gall, where the sentencing judge did not discuss § 3553(a) factors at sentencing or in the
statement of reasons).
187. See United States v. Van Putten, 282 F. App’x 950, 953 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district
court did not fully appreciate the extent of its discretion to deviate from the Guidelines.”
(quoting United States v. Regalado, 518 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2008))).
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C. Correcting Sentences Based on Due Process Claims
A separate group of post-Booker cases correct sentencing errors
based on due process violations reviewed for harmless or plain error.
188
In United States v. Corona-Gonzalez, a sentencing judge plainly
erred by relying on an inaccurate record of the defendant’s previous
189
deportations. The sentencing judge cited deterring future violations
190
as a “salient factor” in the high Guidelines range.
After finding plain error, the Ninth Circuit underscored that the
error affected the defendant’s substantial rights because of its due
process implications:
It is established firmly that ‘convicted defendants have a due process
right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate and reliable
information.’ If the district court did indeed sentence Mr. CoronaGonzalez based on a fact not supported by the record, it would
191
deprive Mr. Corona-Gonzalez of this right.
192

In United States v. Ortiz, the First Circuit recently reviewed a
sentence for which the defendant’s criminal history category included
193
two points for a contempt conviction that was previously dismissed.
The court remanded for resentencing because “[d]ue process
‘guarantees every defendant a right to be sentenced upon information
which is not false or materially incorrect,’” and allowing “such
erroneous information [to] materially influence[] the sentencing
194
calculus” would undermine the integrity of that process.
The Sixth Circuit recently used similar reasoning in United States
195
v. Wilson, where the sentencing court stated that a bank-fraud
defendant’s theft of money orders and bank checks was an important
factor in the sentence, but the record showed that a third party stole

188. United States v. Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2010).
189. Id. at 340–41. During sentencing, the judge referred three times to the fact that the
defendant had been previously deported, a fact which was untrue and unsupported in the
record. Id. at 341.
190. Id. at 342.
191. Id. at 343 (quoting United States v. Kovic, 830 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1987)).
192. United States v. Ortiz, 741 F.3d 288 (1st Cir. 2014).
193. Id. at 291. The erroneous inclusion of the two criminal history points caused the
defendant’s Guidelines range to be 21 to 27 months, when it should have been 15 to 21 months.
Id. After stating that the defendant’s actions—a felon-in-possession conviction—warranted a
small upward variance, the judge sentenced him to 36 months in prison. Id. at 290–91.
194. Id. at 295 (quoting United States v. Tavano, 12 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 1993)).
195. United States v. Wilson, 614 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2010).
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196

the items rather than the defendant. The court exercised its
discretion to correct plain error given “the general rule that a
violation of due process exists when a sentencing judge relies upon
197
erroneous information.”
Finally, the Ninth Circuit recently applied a similar approach to a
198
sentence that relied on tenuous facts. At former prison guard Brian
McGowan’s sentencing for assaulting inmates, the judge considered
unreliable out-of-court remarks claiming McGowan sold and used
199
drugs. The judge’s comments indicated the evidence materially
200
impacted McGowan’s sentence. The Ninth Circuit applied a twopronged test to determine whether the proceedings violated
201
McGowan’s due process rights. McGowan could show a violation if
the drug allegations were “(1) false or unreliable, and (2)
202
demonstrably made the basis for the sentence.” The court found the
allegations insufficiently reliable because nothing in the record
supported them and the sentencing judge made no attempt to verify
203
them. Upon finding that the sentence was materially impacted, the
204
Ninth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing.
These cases show how inaccurate or unreliable information that
serves as an input for a sentence or the sentence’s Guidelines range
can infect the proceedings so as to amount to a violation of due
process.
IV. CHALLENGING ERRORS ON COLLATERAL REVIEW
After the appeals process runs its course, a defendant’s
conviction and sentence ultimately become final. At that point, if a
federal prisoner wants to bring a sentencing-error claim, the vehicle is
28 U.S.C. § 2255. Congress created the provision to provide a habeas
remedy for federal prisoners in the district court that convicted and
205
sentenced them. Claims brought under § 2255 face different
196. Id. at 223–24.
197. Id. at 225 (quoting Arnett v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 681, 686 (6th Cir. 2005)).
198. United States v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601, 606–09 (9th Cir. 2012).
199. Id. at 603–04.
200. Id. at 608 (noting that the judge said the drug issues were “unforgivable”).
201. Id. at 606.
202. Id. (quoting United States v. Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 935–36 (9th Cir. 2009)).
203. Id. at 606–08.
204. Id. at 609.
205. For a discussion of the history and purpose of § 2255, see United States v. Hayman, 342
U.S. 205, 210–19 (1952). The Hayman Court explained that § 2255 affords federal prisoners a
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standards from Gall claims on direct appeal. Under § 2255, federal
prisoners may move to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentence for
(1) sentences “imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States,” (2) when the trial court lacked jurisdiction, (3)
sentences exceeding the statutory maximum authorized, and (4)
206
sentences otherwise subject to collateral attack.
Section 2255 also includes several important limitations. First,
there are several procedural barriers, mostly creations of the
207
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
With AEDPA, Congress amended § 2255 to include a one-year
208
limitations period, with several narrow exceptions, and to include
209
limits on second or successive § 2255 petitions. The Supreme Court
has also limited “cognizable” nonconstitutional claims to those
alleging “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice” or “an omission inconsistent with the
210
rudimentary demands of fair procedure.”
A. The “Miscarriage of Justice” Gateway
Before examining appellate courts’ treatment of errors, a more
in-depth understanding of the Supreme Court’s discussion of the
“miscarriage of justice” standard is useful to put sentencing errors on
collateral review in context. The Court has not extensively defined
habeas remedy in the sentencing court because, until that point, federal prisoners directed their
habeas petitions to courts that happened to be in districts in which federal prisons were located.
Id. at 217 n.25 (citing a Statement, prepared by then–Circuit Judge Stone, submitted to
Congress on behalf of the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure). This
resulted in an overwhelming volume of habeas petitions in those courts, id., leading Congress to
provide for habeas consideration in the trial and sentencing court so as “to meet practical
difficulties that had arisen in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts,”
id. at 219.
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012).
207. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 105, 110
Stat. 1214, 1220 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012)).
208. The limitations period, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), runs from the latest date of (1)
the date a prisoner’s judgment becomes final; (2) the date on which an illegal or
unconstitutional government impediment to the prisoner making the motion is removed; (3) the
prisoner’s assertion of a right newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the subsequent discovery of supporting facts that
were otherwise undiscoverable through due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(2)–(4).
209. See id. § 2255(h) (allowing successive motions only if they are certified by the court of
appeals and either contain newly discovered evidence likely to prove innocence by clear and
convincing evidence, or rely on a new, previously unavailable constitutional rule made
retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court).
210. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962).
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the contours of what amounts to a miscarriage of justice in general,
much less in the context of sentencing errors, but its cases addressing
211
§ 2255 provide some guidance. In Hill v. United States, the Court
held that failure to inform a defendant of his allocution rights at
212
sentencing was not cognizable. The Court emphasized that the
defendant was not affirmatively denied an opportunity to speak at the
sentencing hearing, that there was no suggestion the judge was
“misinformed or uninformed as to any relevant circumstance[],” and
that the defendant did not claim he necessarily would have had
213
something to say if given the opportunity.
An intervening change in substantive law that renders conduct
214
215
no longer criminal is cognizable. In Davis v. United States, a
California court convicted Joseph Davis of failure to report for
induction to the armed forces following several unanswered orders by
216
a local draft board. Intervening decisions in the Ninth Circuit and
the Supreme Court showed that the draft board was not statutorily
217
authorized to declare Davis delinquent in the first place. Without
elaborating, the Court reasoned that if a prisoner’s punishment is for
something the law does not make criminal, “[t]here can be no room
for doubt that such a circumstance inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice and presents exceptional circumstances that
218
justify [§ 2255] collateral relief.” Although an intervening change in
substantive law that changes the criminality of a defendant’s initial
conduct is cognizable, the Court has not decided whether errors that
substantively affect the defendant’s sentence are.
Since Davis, the Court has ruled that violations of certain
procedural rules generally do not merit relief. In United States v.
219
Timmreck, a judge’s acceptance of a defendant’s guilty plea failed to
inform the defendant of a special-parole term that he was entitled to
know under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but

211. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
212. In Hill, the defendant moved to vacate his sentence, claiming § 2255 entitled him to a
new sentence because the sentencing judge denied him the right to speak on his own behalf at
sentencing, a violation of Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 426.
213. Id. at 429.
214. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346–47 (1974).
215. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974).
216. Id. at 336.
217. Id. at 337–40.
218. Id. at 346–47.
219. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979).
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220

the Court ruled the oversight was not cognizable. The defendant’s
allegation of a “technical violation” did not claim “he was actually
unaware of the special parole term or that . . . he would not have
221
pleaded guilty.” But the Court noted relief might be available “in
222
the context of other aggravating circumstances.”
223
In United States v. Addonizio, the Court held that a federal
prisoner’s claim was not cognizable when he argued that changes to
federal parole policies that came after the judge sentenced him
224
prolonged the sentence beyond what the judge intended. The
change in parole policies did not “infect [the sentence] with any error
of fact or law of the ‘fundamental’ character that renders the entire
proceeding irregular and invalid,” nor was the sentence “based on
225
‘misinformation of constitutional magnitude.’”
The error was
“based not on any objectively ascertainable error but on the
226
frustration of the subjective intent of the sentencing judge.”
The Court also declined to recognize a claim when authorities
did not charge a federal defendant within the period set forth in a
227
228
federal–state prisoner-transfer agreement. In Reed v. Farley, the
Court held that the defendant, Orrin Scott Reed, did not have a
cognizable claim because he “registered no objection . . . and suffered
229
no prejudice.” Like Hill and Timmreck, the case lacked the
“aggravating circumstances [that] render[] the need for the remedy
230
afforded by the writ of habeas corpus apparent.”

220. Id. at 782–83.
221. Id. at 784.
222. Id. at 784–85.
223. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979).
224. Id. at 190.
225. Id. at 186–87.
226. Id. at 187.
227. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994). In Reed, authorities transferred a federal prisoner,
Orrin Scott Reed, from federal to state custody. Id. at 342. Authorities executed his transfer
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD), 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, a compact among
forty-eight states and the federal government for transferring prisoners facing charges in
another jurisdiction. Id. at 341. Among other things, the IAD included a speedy-trial provision
requiring prisoners be tried within 120 days, and that charges be dismissed with prejudice if a
trial did not occur within that time period. Id. at 341–42. Reed brought his challenge under 28
U.S.C. § 2254, the federal habeas remedy for state prisoners, id. at 342, which the Court noted
involves the same “fundamental defect” test as § 2255, id. at 353–54.
228. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994).
229. Id. at 342.
230. Id. at 350 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted)).
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Finally, failure to inform a defendant of his right to appeal his
sentence is not cognizable if the defendant already knows of his
231
appeal rights and suffers no prejudice from the oversight. In
232
Peguero v. United States, the petitioner argued his sentencing
violated Rule 32(a)’s requirement that the court advise defendants of
233
“any right to appeal the sentence.” The Court held that the
violation was not cognizable because an evidentiary hearing revealed
Peguero “knew of his right and hence suffered no prejudice from the
234
[sentencing court’s] omission.”
B. Error Correction on Collateral Review
Dating back to before Booker, courts of appeals generally held
235
that ordinary Guidelines misapplications were not cognizable.
Ordinary factual and legal errors correctable on direct appeal no
longer merited resentencing once a sentence has become final.
The courts of appeals appear to agree, however, that claims pass
the cognizability test if an erroneous sentencing enhancement caused
a prisoner to be sentenced above the maximum sentence otherwise
236
authorized by statute. The Supreme Court has also made clear that
231. Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 24 (1999).
232. Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23 (1999).
233. Id. at 26 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)).
234. Id. at 24.
235. See Burke v. United States, 152 F.3d 1329, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding cognizable
on collateral review a challenge by a prisoner whose Guidelines rested on an obstruction-ofjustice enhancement that a subsequent Guidelines amendment made clear was wrong); United
States v. Payne, 99 F.3d 1273, 1281–82 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a prisoner’s claim that
the sentencing court inappropriately denied him an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and
erred calculating his drug quantity was not cognizable, because an improper application of the
Guidelines is a nonconstitutional issue that could have been raised on direct appeal and is not
cognizable on collateral review); Graziano v. United States, 83 F.3d 587, 589–90 (2d Cir. 1996)
(per curiam) (concluding that a fine imposed in excess of the Guidelines’ allowable maximum
was not cognizable on collateral review when the defendant failed to raise it on direct appeal);
Auman v. United States, 67 F.3d 157, 161 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[O]rdinary questions of guideline
interpretation falling short of the ‘miscarriage of justice’ standard do not present a proper
section 2255 claim.”); Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 773 (1st Cir. 1994) (concluding that
the sentencing court’s erroneous addition of two criminal history points did not amount to a
“miscarriage of justice” because the defendant’s sentence fell within corrected Guidelines range
and defendant had ample opportunity to raise the issue of direct appeal); United States v.
Vaughn, 955 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Nonconstitutional claims that could have been
raised on direct appeal, but were not, may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding.”).
236. See Bryant v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253, 1278 (11th Cir. 2013) (granting relief where
Begay error led defendant to be sentenced above what would otherwise have been the statutory
maximum without his armed career criminal enhancement); Jones v. United States, 689 F.3d
621, 627–28 (6th Cir. 2012) (granting § 2255 relief where Begay made clear prisoner’s prior
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1. Erroneous Career Offender Enhancements. What if a judge
sentences a defendant as a career offender, and a subsequent
Supreme Court decision makes clear that the predicate crimes no
longer count? Several recent cases have rejected such claims. These
cases generally derive from decisions that narrow the scope of
offenses qualifying as “violent felonies” for sentencing purposes: the
Supreme Court excluded driving under the influence, escape based on
failure to report, and battery based on mere offensive touching from
238
the list of violent felonies. The Fourth Circuit also recently
239
reinterpreted the way courts treat state drug crimes, leading some
prisoners sentenced as career offenders to face sentences that they
240
would not face today. And the uncertainty shows no signs of
241
stopping. In the 2015 case Johnson v. United States, the Court struck
down a statutory enhancement provision of the Armed Career
Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), which imposes mandatory minimums
for recidivists with certain enumerated violent felonies or felonies
covered by the so-called residual clause—those that “otherwise
involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
242
injury to another.” The Court struck down the residual clause’s

offenses were not violent felonies, and his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum he would
have faced without the armed career criminal enhancement that relied on those prior offenses);
United States v. Williams, 396 F. App’x 951, 952 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (granting § 2255
relief when Begay made prisoner’s sentence as armed career criminal sentence above the
statutory maximum without the enhancement).
237. Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 302 (2005) (holding that vacatur of a state
conviction is grounds for challenging an enhanced sentence, and that it tolls the statute of
limitations in § 2255 so long as the prisoner has diligently pursued his rights).
238. See Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010) (holding that element of
“actually and intentionally touching” under Florida’s battery law did not necessarily make the
offense a “violent felony”); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 123 (2009) (holding that
an escape conviction based on a failure to report is not a “violent felony”); Begay v. United
States, 553 U.S. 137, 139 (2008) (holding that a drunk-driving conviction is not a “violent
felony”).
239. See United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 248 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that
defendant’s first-time marijuana possession did not qualify as a predicate-felony conviction for
purposes of Controlled Substances Act).
240. See Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 181 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (declining to
address petitioner’s arguments that his sentence should be vacated post-Simmons because prior
drug offenses would not qualify as predicate-felony convictions).
241. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
242. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
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language as unconstitutionally vague because “[i]nvoking so shapeless
a provision to condemn someone to prison for 15 years to life does
243
not comport with the Constitution’s guarantee of due process.”
Violent predicates for the career offender enhancement include a
244
provision identical to the one struck down in Johnson. The Court’s
decision introduces even greater uncertainty for prisoners sentenced
as career offenders whose enhancement may be based on
unconstitutionally vague language.
For prisoners claiming their sentences rest on legally mistaken
designations as career offenders, the courts of appeals have generally
245
denied these prisoners collateral relief. In Sun Bear v. United States,
defendant Marlon Dale Sun Bear received a 360-month sentence
246
based on a Guidelines range of 360 months to life. Based partially
on a prior conviction for attempted auto theft, Sun Bear’s Guidelines
included a career offender enhancement based on an attempted-auto247
theft conviction that he unsuccessfully challenged on direct appeal.
Six years later, the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United
248
States led the Eighth Circuit to conclude that auto theft was not a
249
“crime of violence” and Sun Bear challenged his sentence in a
§ 2255 motion. An en banc Eighth Circuit reasoned that Sun Bear’s
claim was not cognizable because the erroneous career offender
designation did not entail “a fundamental defect which inherently
250
results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” In reaching that
conclusion, the court emphasized Sun Bear’s sentence was within the
251
statutory maximum authorized by statute, and he could receive the

243. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560.
244. See U.S. SENTENCING MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (“The
term ‘crime of violence’ means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”).
245. Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
246. Id. at 702.
247. Id. Without the career offender enhancement, his range would have been 292 to 365
months.
248. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
249. United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969, 975–76 (8th Cir. 2008).
250. Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 704 (quoting United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185
(1979)).
251. Sun Bear pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, for which the maximum punishment
when Sun Bear faced sentencing was life imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2012)
(“Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or
for life.”).
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same punishment were his case vacated for resentencing. The court
limited relief under the miscarriage-of-justice test to an intervening
change in law that makes the prisoner’s conduct lawful or new
253
evidence suggesting the prisoner was actually innocent of the crime.
The Eleventh Circuit has twice considered challenges to career
offender enhancement based on subsequent reinterpretation of
254
predicate offenses. In Gilbert v. United States, Ezell Gilbert pleaded
guilty to crack-cocaine and marijuana trafficking, and was sentenced
255
as a career offender. One of his predicate crimes was carrying a
concealed weapon, which he unsuccessfully challenged at sentencing
256
and on direct appeal. The next year he filed a § 2255 petition
257
challenging other aspects of his sentence. After Begay led the
Eleventh Circuit to exclude his crime from the violent-felony list, he
258
brought another § 2255 challenge. The Eleventh Circuit denied
Gilbert’s petition based on § 2255(h)’s prohibition on successive
259
motions.
The Eleventh Circuit recently went further in Spencer v. United
260
States and ruled that a prisoner in Gilbert’s situation could not
challenge an erroneous career offender enhancement even in a timely
261
§ 2255 petition. In Spencer, defendant Kevin Spencer pleaded guilty
to distributing cocaine and faced a career offender enhancement
262
based on previous convictions for child abuse and selling cocaine.
He unsuccessfully challenged the designation of his conviction for
263
child abuse as a crime of violence on direct appeal. Two weeks later,
the Supreme Court decided Begay, causing Spencer to challenge his

252. Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 705.
253. Id. at 706.
254. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011).
255. Id. at 1299. Gilbert’s Guidelines range was 292 to 365 months, but would have been 151
to 188 months without the career offender status. Id. at 1303.
256. Id. at 1300–01.
257. Id. at 1301.
258. United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
259. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1307–08. The court also held that Guidelines miscalculations cannot
be challenged via § 2255’s savings clause. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012) (outlining
provisions of the savings clause).
260. Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2014).
261. Id. at 1135.
262. Id. The enhancement increased Spencer’s Guidelines range from a span of 70 to 87
months to a span of 151 to 180 months, and the judge eventually sentenced him to 151 months in
prison. Id. at 1148.
263. Id. at 1136.
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264

sentence in a § 2255 motion. A panel initially granted Spencer’s
petition, but an en banc Eleventh Circuit reversed, ruling that § 2255
did not provide relief for sentencing errors unless a prisoner could
265
prove innocence or vacatur of a predicate offense. The court
reasoned that even if Spencer were not a career offender, his sentence
266
fell below the statutory maximum and was lawful. The court also
relied on the Guidelines’ advisory nature, which allows the sentencing
267
court to impose the same sentence on remand. The court also
emphasized the importance of finality to deterrence and the efficient
268
operation of the criminal justice system.
The Seventh Circuit has wrestled with the cognizability of
erroneous career offender enhancements as well. In Narvaez v.
269
United States, the defendant was sentenced as a career offender
based on two prior escape convictions for failure to return to
confinement. Despite the defendant’s sentence being within statutory
limits, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that his career offender
categorization was “the lodestar” to the court’s Guidelines
270
calculation. As a result, the court found the intervening clarification
of law made Narvaez’s sentence illegal and “constitute[d] a
271
miscarriage of justice, entitling him to relief.”
Narvaez was sentenced pre-Booker, when the Sentencing
Guidelines were mandatory, and the Seventh Circuit went on to hold
272
that claims by prisoners sentenced after Booker are not cognizable.
273
In Hawkins v. United States, the court reasoned that erroneous
enhancements under the advisory regime are “less serious,” and do
not constitute a miscarriage of justice as long as the sentence was
274
below the statutory maximum. The Hawkins court reasoned that
the sentencing judge would likely have sentenced Hawkins similarly
264. Id.
265. Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1139 (“A prisoner may challenge a sentencing error as a
‘fundamental defect’ on collateral review when he can prove that he is either actually innocent
of his crime or that a prior conviction used to enhance his sentence has been vacated, but
Spencer’s motion alleges nothing of the kind.”).
266. Id. at 1139.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1144.
269. Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011).
270. Id. at 629.
271. Id. at 630.
272. Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2013).
273. Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2013).
274. Id. at 824.
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275

without the career offender enhancement. The Hawkins court also
heavily emphasized finality, stating that the Supreme Court’s
miscarriage-of-justice cases strike a balance between finality and the
injustice of a possibly mistaken sentence, which excludes relief for
276
sentencing errors once a sentence is final.
The story is the same in the Fourth Circuit. In a pair of cases, the
Fourth Circuit has ruled that a mistaken designation as a career
offender is not a sufficiently serious mistake to either toll § 2255’s
277
or clear the seemingly insurmountable
period of limitations
278
279
miscarriage-of-justice hurdle.
In Whiteside v. United States,
DeAngelo Whiteside’s career offender enhancement relied on a state
280
crime that the Fourth Circuit clarified in United States v. Simmons
281
should have been treated as a misdemeanor. Whiteside challenged
his sentence in a § 2255 motion more than one year after his
282
conviction became final. The Fourth Circuit held his motion was not
283
timely. The limitations period tolls if a petition relies on a new,
previously undiscoverable fact, but, on the court’s reasoning,
Simmons was not a new fact for purposes of the limitations
284
provision. The court also held that the limitations period should not
285
be equitably tolled. The prospect that Whiteside’s petition would be
denied in a claim brought before Simmons did not rise to the
286
“extraordinary circumstances” contemplated by the test for tolling.

275. Id. at 823.
276. Id. at 825.
277. Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 2014).
278. United States v. Foote, 784 F.3d 931, 932 (4th Cir. 2015).
279. Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2014).
280. United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
281. Whiteside, 775 F.3d at 182. Whiteside faced a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months,
which included a career offender enhancement based on two state drug crimes. Id. Following a
government motion for a departure based on substantial assistance, the judge sentenced
Whiteside to 210 months in prison. Id.
282. Id. Whiteside waived his right to appeal in his plea agreement. Whiteside v. United
States, 748 F.3d 541, 545 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 775 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2014).
283. Whiteside, 775 F.3d at 182.
284. Id. at 184; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4) (2012) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall
apply to a motion under this section. . . . [It] shall run from the date on which the facts
supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence.”).
285. Under Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), the limitations period of § 2255 may be
equitably tolled when “(1) [the prisoner] has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) . . .
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 649.
286. Whiteside, 775 F.3d at 185.

BAILEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

RUN-ON SENTENCE

3/15/2016 7:30 AM

1513

The court did not answer the question of whether such an error
amounted to a miscarriage of justice.
The Fourth Circuit did answer that question in United States v.
287
288
Foote, and its answer was no. In Foote, Wesley Foote appealed his
289
262-month sentence for distribution of crack cocaine. Because of a
Simmons error, the sentencing court had mistakenly categorized
Foote as a career offender, causing his Guidelines range to nearly
double: from a span of 151 to 188 months to a span of 262 to 327
290
months. The Fourth Circuit nonetheless ruled that the error was not
291
cognizable. The court reasoned that the other instances amounting
292
to a miscarriage of justice addressed claims of actual innocence, that
the Guidelines’ advisory nature could render an equally harsh
293
sentence on remand,
and that deeming a Guidelines error
cognizable would be unworkable without a clean limiting principle.
2. Error Correction on Due Process Grounds. The preceding
cases imply there is no collateral remedy for sentencing errors other
than for sentences that exceed statutory maximums and for vacatur of
predicate convictions. But several appellate courts have granted
resentencing for similar errors based on due process challenges dating
294
back to the pre-reform era. In United States v. Malcolm, the Second
Circuit granted § 2255 relief when the judge misapprehended the
defendant’s criminal record and refused to hear evidence of the
295
defendant’s cooperation.
The court remanded based on the
principle that “[m]isinformation or misunderstanding that is
materially untrue regarding a prior criminal record, or material false
assumptions as to any facts relevant to sentencing, renders the entire
296
sentencing procedure invalid as a violation of due process.”

287. United States v. Foote, 784 F.3d 931 (4th Cir. 2015).
288. Id. at 940.
289. Id. at 932.
290. Id. at 933.
291. Id. at 940.
292. Id. at 940–41.
293. Id. at 941–43.
294. United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1970).
295. Id. at 818. The sentencing judge thought a bank-robbery defendant had previously
pleaded guilty to two of four state robbery indictments. Id. at 815. The defendant had pleaded
guilty to one consolidated charge, and three others were dismissed. Id. at 815–16. His second
guilty plea was to a fifth robbery charge that had been reduced to petty larceny. Id. at 816.
296. Id. at 816.
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In United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, the Seventh Circuit
heard an appeal from a sentence in which the judge mistakenly
believed the defendant had a previous conviction for armed robbery
298
where the previous conviction was actually for robbery. Relying on
Townsend v. Burke and United States v. Tucker, the court explained
that “a sentence must be set aside where the defendant can show that
299
false information was part of the basis for the sentence.”
This same reasoning led courts to grant habeas relief after the
300
SRA. In Shukwit v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit granted
§ 2255 relief to a defendant whose PSR inaccurately labeled him a
301
principal in the drug scheme for which he had pleaded guilty. At
sentencing, he disputed the report, but the court never made a
302
finding.
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that “due process
protects the right not to be sentenced on the basis of false
information,” and confirmed that “Shukwit’s claim that he was
sentenced on the basis of false information contained in the [PSR] is
303
cognizable in this petition.”
The Third Circuit most comprehensively engaged the
intersection of habeas relief and defendants’ due process rights at
304
sentencing. In United States v. Eakman, a defendant pleaded guilty
305
to anabolic-steroids and money-laundering charges. The judge
sentenced Eakman to one year and a day in prison, with a
recommendation to the Bureau of Prisons that Eakman serve his
sentence at a community corrections center (that is, a halfway
306
house). A month into his sentence, a Justice Department memo
concluded the Bureau lacked legal authority to assign prisoners to
halfway houses while under a term of imprisonment and the Bureau
307
accordingly transferred Eakman to prison. He brought a habeas
motion under § 2255 claiming the sentencing judge did not accurately

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 866.
Lane, 738 F.2d at 865.
Shukwit v. United States, 973 F.2d 903 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
Id. at 904.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Eakman, 378 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 296.
Id.
Id.
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understand the law governing the Bureau’s legal authority. The
Third Circuit held that the circumstances Eakman alleged would, if
true, violate due process, and if a hearing showed such circumstances
existed Eakman deserved resentencing under an accurate
309
understanding of the Bureau’s legal authority.
The court explained that “due process clearly guarantees all
defendants the right to be sentenced under an accurate understanding
310
of the law.” Interpreting the Supreme Court’s Addonizio decision
as excluding sentencing errors that are not “objectively ascertainable”
from collateral relief, the court applied a two-part test for correcting
sentencing errors on collateral review that requires showing
(1) the district court made an objectively ascertainable error (one
that does not require courts to probe the mind of the sentencing
judge) and (2) the district court materially relied on that error in
311
determining the appropriate sentence.

Applying this test, the Third Circuit concluded the judge’s
misperception of the Bureau of Prisons’ authority was “objectively
312
ascertainable.” The court ordered a hearing to determine the extent
to which the judge’s “legal misapprehension” impacted Eakman’s
sentence, and if it did, the court said, it amounted to a due process
313
violation that merited resentencing. In so ruling, the opinion
emphasized that “it is hard to imagine how a sentence could ever be
deemed fair when there is some way to verify the sentencing court’s
error externally (whether an error of fact or an error of law) and
314
when that error caused the misguided sentence.” Eakman holds
particular significance, not only because it recognizes pre-SRA
conceptions of due process rights to accurate sentencing, but also
because it shows those principles survive AEDPA.
C. Erroneous Career Offender Enhancements in Context
Where does this leave federal inmates serving career offender
enhanced sentences who would not face such severe Guidelines
ranges today? The courts of appeals have been fairly clear that an
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 300–01.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id. at 300–01.
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erroneous career offender enhancement is correctable on direct
315
appeal under harmless and plain-error analysis. But for the majority
of career offenders, collateral attack is the only vehicle available to
raise their claims unless the Supreme Court fortuitously takes a case
reinterpreting predicate felonies before their sentence becomes final.
Once it is final, the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held
that the error simply lacks the severity required for § 2255 to
recognize it. In the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, that applies even if
the defendant raised the argument on direct appeal. The Fourth
Circuit left open the possibility that a timely claim could be
cognizable, but held that claims brought after that period are
untimely and are insufficiently extraordinary to merit tolling the
limitations period.
The functional result of these decisions is a procedural quagmire
for erroneously sentenced career offenders. In the cases of Sun Bear
and Spencer, the defendants correctly asserted from the beginning
316
that they were not career offenders. In Hawkins, the Seventh
317
Circuit said such errors are correctable on direct appeal, but given
the futility of direct appeal in Sun Bear and Spencer it would appear
no remedy exists at any stage. And direct appeal is unavailable to the
large group of defendants who waive appeal rights as part of plea
318
agreements.
The reasoning in Sun Bear, Hawkins, and Spencer is difficult to
reconcile with the principles emanating from caselaw on due process
in sentencing. If due process does, as the Eakman court put it,
“clearly guarantee[] all defendants the right to be sentenced under an
319
accurate understanding of the law,” it is hard to see how the federal
system affords erroneously sentenced career offenders due process.
In fact, the Eakman court’s interpretation of Supreme Court
§ 2255 jurisprudence articulates a much more workable rule—one

315. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 639 F.3d 489, 497–98 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding
reversible error); United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 453 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding plain error).
316. Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir. 2014); Sun Bear v. United
States, 644 F.3d 700, 701 (8th Cir. 2011).
317. Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 824 (2013) (“An erroneous computation of an
advisory guidelines sentence is reversible (unless harmless) on direct appeal; it doesn't follow
that it’s reversible years later in a postconviction proceeding.”).
318. See Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 127,
130 (1995) (discussing the rise in popularity of appeals waivers on the part of federal
prosecutors).
319. Eakman, 378 F.3d at 302.
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that bases relief on whether the error is (1) objectively ascertainable,
320
and (2) materially relied upon at sentencing. This mirrors the test
321
for due process violations dating back to the pre-reform era and
322
recently employed by the Ninth Circuit in McGowan. The second
prong also reflects the Supreme Court’s own cognizability cases,
which explain that lack of prejudice or “aggravating circumstances” is
323
what undermines cognizability.
The decisions denying relief to mistaken career offenders
324
emphasize the interest in finality. Arguments favoring finality often
cite preservation of judicial resources, concerns about stale evidence,
325
and harm to victims of prolonged litigation. But these concerns hold
326
less weight in the context of correcting sentencing errors. The
Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure has resolved to
consider a possible amendment to Rule 52 to permit consideration of
320. Id. at 301.
321. See United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156, 1167 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[A] defendant[’s] . . .
due process rights have been violated by the sentencing court’s reliance on false or unreliable
information, [if] he [can] make a showing of two elements: (1) that the challenged evidence is
materially false or unreliable, and (2) that it actually served as the basis for the sentence.”);
Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1359 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[A] sentence will be vacated on
appeal if the challenged information is (1) false or unreliable, and (2) demonstrably made the
basis for the sentence.”).
322. United States v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601, 606 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that due
process is violated upon a showing that allegations relied upon by the sentencing judge were
“(1) false or unreliable, and (2) demonstrably made the basis for the sentence”).
323. See Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 24 (1999) (“[Defendant] knew of his right [to
appeal] and hence suffered no prejudice from the omission.”); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 342
(1994) (“The defendant registered no objection to the trial date at the time it was set, and
suffered no prejudice attributable to the delayed commencement.”); United States v. Timmreck,
441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (“Respondent does not argue that he was actually unaware of the
special parole term or that, if he had been properly advised by the trial judge, he would not have
pleaded guilty.”); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429 (1962) (noting the lack of “aggravating
circumstances” such as an affirmative denial of allocution rights, the judge being “misinformed
or uninformed as to any relevant circumstances,” or evidence of what defendant would have
addressed given the chance).
324. See, e.g., Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1144 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Finality ‘is
essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is
deprived of much of its deterrent effect.’” (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989)));
Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he social interest in a belated
correction of the error outweighed by the social interest in the finality of judicial decisions,
including sentences.”).
325. See Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral
Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 145–56 (2012) (discussing the arguments in favor of finality and why
they are less pronounced in the context of correcting sentencing errors).
326. See United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he context of
review of a sentencing error is fundamentally different[,] . . . [because] the cost of correcting a
sentencing error is far less than the cost of a retrial.”).
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sentencing errors outside plain-error review because such errors are
327
less burdensome to revisit than trial errors. In addition, forcing
prisoners to serve longer sentences than the law contemplates only
expends more resources on costly incarceration.
The decisions denying relief also stress the risk of opening the
328
floodgates to more appeals. But career offenders comprise less than
329
3 percent of federal sentences. The career offender flood is
probably less ominous than these appellate judges fear. What is more,
the Guidelines themselves provide an intuitive limiting principle:
courts could implement a rule that limits relief to defendants subject
to erroneous criminal history overrides because of the overrides’
drastic effect on a defendant’s Guidelines range. And courts should
weigh finality against interests in justice and fundamental fairness.
After all, “without justice, finality is nothing more than a bureaucratic
330
achievement.” The Sentencing Commission, for example, voted to
retroactively reduce base offense levels for certain drug crimes in the
interest of fairness, and the multitude of federal sentences eligible for
331
reconsideration dwarfs erroneous career offender sentences. What
is more, finality need not overwhelm the interest in fairly sentencing
defendants the way the law accurately contemplates.
CONCLUSION
Whether stemming from concerns for due process or
fundamental fairness, the availability of relief for sentences based on
factual, legal, or procedural error rests on the principle that at
sentencing judges should have an accurate picture of the defendant,

327. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
AGENDA BOOK 487 (May 2014).
328. Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824 (expressing concern about the toll on the courts’ and Justice
Department’s resources if “every precedential decision interpreting the guidelines favorably to
a prisoner were a ticket to being resentenced”).
329. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 101, at 1 (stating that of the 84,173 cases
reported to United States Sentencing Commission in 2014, only 2232 included career offender
enhancements).
330. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1337 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Hill, J.,
dissenting).
331. See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission
Unanimously Votes to Allow Delayed Retroactive Reduction in Drug Trafficking Sentences
(July 18, 2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-newsadvisories/press-releases/20140718_press_release.pdf [http://perma.cc/XP9E-UEW5] (projecting
that more than 46,000 prisoners will be eligible for resentencing due to changes in the drugquantity table).
THE U.S.,
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the offense, and the law’s treatment of both. Under today’s advisory
regime, judges retain significant discretion in imposing sentences.
When a judge sits down to sentence a defendant, she ought to
consider only accurate inputs. In the pre-Guidelines days when
judges’ discretion was even greater, flawed inputs meant a flawed
sentence, and defendants had a due process right to a new one.
Today, the Guidelines are a very significant input. Since Congress
reformed the federal sentencing system, it has evolved in the context
of uncertainty. Federal prosecutors, Congress, the Commission, and
the courts are still resolving how to consistently and fairly execute
that system. When that uncertainty leads to a prisoner serving a
career offender sentence that he would not face if sentenced today, he
should at least have a remedy for correcting it.

